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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

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SUBJECT: The German-American Conference at Bad Godesberg,
October 1-4, 1959

It is the Embassy's impression that the first "German-American Conference", held at Bad Godesberg October 1-4, 1959, is regarded by most of the American and German participants and observers as having been highly successful. One of the reasons for the success of the conference, which was arranged by the Atlantik-Bruecke organization on the German side and the American Council on Germany for the Americans, was the unusually high level of the American representation for such a private informal discussion group. The conference, for which the discussion theme was "East-West Tensions - Present Status - Future Developments" was attended on the American side by such prominent figures as Senators Dodd and Keating, Mr. McCloy, former Ambassador Conant, Dean Acheson, Governor Meyner of New Jersey, and General Gavin. The German delegation included such men as Kiesinger and Von Hassel (Minister Presidents of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, both CDU), Bundestag President Gerstenmaier and the following well-known Bundestag Deputies: CDU deputies Furer (Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee) and Gradl; SPD deputies Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler and Karl Mommer; and the FDP leader Erich Mende. (A full list of the American and German participants is given on page 16 of Enclosure No. 1 to this Despatch.)

Apart from its success as an informal, friendly, off-the-record, frank exchange of views between prominent Americans and Germans, it appears that, in the political sphere, Chancellor Adenauer's party, the CDU, found the conference to be useful in the sense that it brought home to the German opposition parties (and to a certain extent the public) more clearly than ever before the extent to which American political leaders, both Republicans and Democrats, are convinced that military rearrangements in Europe involving withdrawal of American forces from Germany are totally out of the question if the United States is to continue to play a role in the defense of Europe. The combined testimony in this sense of such outstanding American figures as Senators Dodd and Keating, Mr. McCloy, Dean Acheson, General Gavin, Governor Meyner and Dr. Henry Kissinger had an almost measurable impact

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on the German participants, particularly those belonging to the opposition parties, the SPD and FDP, which for years have been inclined to believe that the Americans might somehow be induced (by a German Government more interested in reunification than Chancellor Adenauer's) both to withdraw their troops from Germany and to continue to guarantee militarily Germany's security.

A report on the conference, in which more detail is given than in this brief introductory commentary, is transmitted as an enclosure to this despatch. On the first day of the conference, after welcoming remarks by President Luebke, Bundestag President Gerstenmaier gave an address in which he startled his audience (which included Chancellor Adenauer) by stating that in his opinion the majority of the German Bundestag would be seriously interested in military disengagement in central Europe, if it were clear that German reunification could be achieved through an agreement involving the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from German soil. The Embassy has been told that Chancellor Adenauer, understandably enough, was considerably disturbed by this statement of Gerstenmaier's. Klaus Mehnert (the expert on Soviet Affairs), who saw the Chancellor the next day told an Embassy officer that the Chancellor had commented to him that it was most disturbing just when he, Adenauer, was doing everything he possibly could to keep American forces in Germany, to have such a prominent representative of the CDU as Gerstenmaier come out with such ideas before an audience of such influential Americans.

The conference session on the second day began with addresses by Dr. Henry Kissinger and Adalbert Weinstein. Kissinger expounded his well-known theory that as the balance of nuclear strength between the U. S. and Soviet Russia has tended to become equal, the U. S. nuclear deterrent has become less and less "credible" as a means of deterring local Soviet aggression; and he called in consequence for a much stronger buildup of forces (American and European) located in Europe, including conventional forces. The West must have really effective means, other than the U. S. strategic deterrent, to defend itself against local aggression in Europe. The best solution of the problem of how to defend Europe is for the U. S. and Europe jointly to build up much stronger forces in Europe, both conventional forces to deal with minor aggression and tactical atomic forces to deal with larger-scale aggression. The development of such forces would provide a credible deterrent, credible in the sense that the Russians would believe that it would actually be used to deal with any kind of Soviet aggression in Europe.

After Kissinger's speech, which was most effective for its logic and the clarity of its presentation (and, we heard later, was found convincing by many of his German, as well as his American, auditors), Weinstein of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung shocked the Conference - particularly its German members - by an address in which he made a number of startlingly heretical statements. Agreeing with Kissinger that local defense

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forces in Europe should be far stronger than they now are, Weinstein then delivered himself of observations and proposals along the following lines: (a) the Germans lack the will to defend themselves, - therefore the defense of Germany depends primarily on others; (b) there should be a large increase in the British and American forces in Germany, quite apart from the French; (c) the fact that French forces are engaged in North Africa, rather than in the defensive line in Europe where they belong, greatly weakens the security of Western Europe; perhaps the NATO allies, including West Germany, should make it possible for the French forces to take their proper place in the defense of Europe by helping them bring the war in Algeria to a speedy end; (d) if these things are not possible, perhaps the Germans should be given or allowed to develop a strategic nuclear deterrent of their own.

Following Weinstein's speech, the conference divided into two "working groups" or panels, one political and the other economic. The political panel session began with a lively discussion of the points Weinstein had made in which the German participants, without exception, sharply disagreed with what Weinstein had said. They, including the SPD representatives, denied that West Germany lacks the will to defense; and they also unanimously rejected the idea that the Federal Republic should have its own strategic nuclear weapons or that it or any NATO state should give military support to France in Algeria. Thereafter, there was discussion of Germany's membership in NATO in relation to the reunification problem and military disengagement. The German advocates of disengagement put forward their ideas stressing that the reason they did so was their conviction that Soviet forces would never withdraw from the Soviet Zone and Eastern Europe unless the Americans, in turn, withdrew from the Federal Republic. Dr. Gerstenmaier in the course of the discussion raised the question as to whether Germany's security against possible Soviet aggression would be adequate if military disengagement (and reunification) should be brought about. If it turns out not to be possible to solve broad problems such as disarmament, he said, perhaps consideration should be given to a regional solution in Europe. A pertinent question was - how adequate would the defense of Germany, the security of Germany, be if disengagement in central Europe could be arranged? Would the U. S. guarantees for the security of Germany remain the same as they are now within the NATO framework? If not, then it was clear that disengagement would not be possible.

The Americans led in this instance by Dean Acheson emphatically rejected the idea of disengagement. They stressed that it was out of the question to station American divisions, after withdrawal from Germany, in France and other European countries. West European nations could not be expected to agree to the stationing on their territory of American troops and installations whose primary task would be the protection of Germany.

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Furthermore, the American Congress would not approve expenditure of the billions of dollars necessary for the purchase of land for barracks and training grounds, or for the construction of military barracks, air bases, etc., involved in such a transfer. In sum, the Americans unanimously stressed that withdrawal of American forces from West Germany was certain to result in their withdrawal from Europe - and once they had withdrawn across the Atlantic they could intervene only with strategic nuclear weapons. Then, they asked, could an American President be expected to "push the buttons of nuclear mass annihilation" in order to come to the assistance of a Europe which had insisted on bringing about the withdrawal of American divisions from Europe, knowing that this would lead to immediate Soviet retaliation, the annihilation of American cities and the death of millions of Americans?

On the subject of Berlin there was, to the gratification of the Germans, complete unanimity among the Americans (as well as the Germans) that interference with the freedom of the Berliners must under no circumstances be permitted; and that in consequence it was necessary that Western troops remain in Berlin. The Germans, for their part, emphasized particularly that what was at stake in Berlin was not only the freedom of the Berliners; Berlin also symbolized the responsibility of the Four Powers for the reunification of Germany. As one of the German participants put it: "it is absolutely essential that perpetuation of the division of Germany not be the price paid for the freedom of the Berliners."

It was also in the political panel discussions that Mr. Acheson first put forward his ideas for a new form of organization of the Atlantic community, involving far closer political and economic association than at present of the U. S. and Canada with the countries of Western Europe, including those which are not members of NATO. Mr. Acheson's proposal aroused a great deal of interest among German participants of all parties; and it was particularly welcomed by Carlo Schmid of the SPD and by the CDU foreign policy expert Kiesinger, who said (during the October 4 session) that if Mr. Acheson's ideas could be realized, he believed it could mean the beginning of a new life for the community of the Atlantic peoples. Klaus Mehnert (who was rapporteur of the political panel) in an account he wrote of the conference in Christ und Welt of October 8, also stressed the importance of Mr. Acheson's proposals. "The importance of the German-American conversations", he said, "could not be better proved than by the fact that one of the leading and most experienced statesmen of the Western world chose this platform for outlining a new and far-seeing plan."

The economic panel discussed such subjects as the Common Market and the Free Trade area, East-West trade, and the problem of Western help for underdeveloped countries. The importance of patience in the development of European economic institutions was stressed; as was also the

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underlying wish for political integration in the case of the Common Market, and the importance of possible eventual merger of the "Six" and the "Seven" in order to avoid the division of Europe into rival groups. Regarding the underdeveloped countries, there was agreement that large-scale aid for these countries was necessary, but that this aid should not be only of an economic nature since, in these countries, some basic prerequisites of modern development particularly in the field of education were lacking.

At the last session of the conference on October 4, summaries of the deliberations of the political and economic panels were given by the rappoeteurs of the two groups; and thereafter Mr. McCloy, who chaired the meeting, called on various prominent representatives of the German and American sides to make a few concluding remarks respecting the work and the themes of the Conference.

Mr. Acheson spoke again regarding his Atlantic Community proposals (cf. page 8, Enclosure No. 1); and Senator Monroney made an interesting statement on the International Development Association (IDA), in which he gave to the Germans and to Professor Erhard, in particular, much of the credit for the successful establishment of IDA. Several of the concluding statements made by the Germans were of particular interest because of the manner in which they stressed the importance of Berlin as a symbol of Four Power responsibility for German reunification; or as indicating that the Germans, both Government and opposition, had been profoundly impressed by the unanimous and emphatic rejection by the American participants, irrespective of party, of the concept of disengagement as a means to achieve reunification.

Thus, Dr. Mommer (SPD) emphasized that whether or not the Russians continue to reject the idea, the West must always, in every negotiation, try to place the Berlin question in the frame of reference in which it belongs, namely that of the problem of Germany as a whole. It would be an illusion, he said, to believe that Berlin could be made permanently secure by paying the price of recognizing or acknowledging the division of Germany. If we try to solve the problem of Berlin's abnormality by writing off reunification and recognizing Germany's division, we would accomplish nothing since Berlin's abnormality and all the dangers involved in this abnormality would still be there. Similarly Dr. Gradl(CDU) emphasized the prime importance of Berlin as a symbol of German unity. Berlin, he said, is for the Germans the locus and symbol of common (Four Power) responsibility for Germany as a whole. He emphasized that maintenance of the position in Berlin is for the Germans not an end in itself for the sake of Berlin alone; but rather that Berlin is for them the "clamp" holding together the two parts of Germany. Berlin is for the Germans, and it must also be for the Western Allies, the very foundation of the joint responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole.

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It is noteworthy that Dr. Gradl, in his concluding remarks, also thought it worthwhile to remind his American listeners that the Germans very much want the Four Powers to engage in continuing negotiations on German reunification. He said that it is the unanimous desire of all parties in the German Bundestag, and of the Federal Government, that the Four Powers somehow arrange for continuing systematic talks and negotiations concerning the German question. And, he added, "we on the German side are ready under such a Four Power roof to make our contribution through 'internal German' (ie., West German-GDR) talks of technical experts."


Kiesinger (CDU) stressed the significance of the fact that all the Americans, of both parties and both civilian and military, had stated "with absolute clarity that they believe that Germany's being out of NATO would have the consequence that American troops would leave Europe"; and that thereafter any American President, in the case of Soviet aggression in Europe, would be faced with the awful decision of whether or not to embark on strategic nuclear war. It is important, Kiesinger said, that we Germans realize that this is the clear and unanimous position of the Americans.

Finally the statement of Dr. Mende, Chairman of the FDP Bundestag faction, was of particular interest in that he made it clear that his own (and through him his party's) thinking about disengagement and re-unification had been rather drastically affected by the absolute unanimity of the Americans at the conference - both Republicans and Democrats - in rejecting disengagement. "This has left a deep impression on me", he said, "and I have drawn from it the bitter political conclusion that at the present time there is no possibility of achieving the political unification of Germany via the path of détente in the military field." He wished to thank his American friends for the frankness with which they had painted a realistic picture of Germany's situation. "It is better to know the realities than to indulge in illusions; and I believe that this conference will have an effect on the forthcoming Bundestag foreign policy debate on November 5."

A Concluding Comment on the Impact of the Conference on the Germans, and the German Mood as Reflected at the Conference

In retrospect two aspects of the German-American Conference stand out as having been of particular interest: Firstly, the fact that although the Germans were reassured by the unanimity on the American side in affirming that Western troops should and would remain in Berlin, and that the United States would not allow the freedom of the Berliners to be tampered with, there was nonetheless considerable concern lest in the forthcoming negotiations the importance of Four Power responsibility for Berlin as a symbol of Four Power responsibility for German reunification

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... forgotten. Secondly, the profound impression which the unanimous rejection by the Americans of the idea of military disengagement made on all the German participants, particularly on the SPD and FDP participants.

On Berlin, the general feeling of satisfaction with the attitude of the Americans was well expressed by Klaus Mehnert in his account of the conference published in Christ und Welt. It was a fortunate coincidence, Mehnert said, that the conference took place precisely in those first October days when after Khrushchev's American trip the Germans had many questions to put to the Americans. It was not the first time that, due to small causes, a certain mutual distrust had come up between the two countries. It was not surprising that Khrushchev's secret conversations with Eisenhower brought forth a multitude of speculations on a possible change of the course of the American policy vis-a-vis Germany. The Germans, and their press, these things frequently show more nervousness than is desirable. Consequently, these German-American talks came right in the middle of the apprehensions which arose in Germany regarding an alleged change of the Berlin policy of Washington. In such a situation nothing is better than a frank discussion. After this introduction, Mehnert went on to stress the satisfaction of the Germans - to which Embassy officers can also testify - at the firmness and unanimity with which the Americans declared that U. S. troops would remain in Berlin and that the United States would, under no circumstances, permit interference with the freedom of the Berliners. Mehnert also pointed out however - undoubtedly thinking of the remarks made by Dr. Gradl and Dr. Mommer - that it was the Germans who had emphasized that it was "essential that perpetuation of the division of Germany not be the price paid for the freedom of the Berliners." In the Embassy's view, Mommer's and Gradl's emphasis on the dangers of any Berlin settlement involving or implying acceptance of the permanence of the division of Germany is an accurate reflection of the profound concern felt at the present time by those many Germans who really care about Berlin's future and the re-unification of their country.

Perhaps the most significant effect of the conference was the impact on the Germans of the clear and unanimous rejection by the Americans of military disengagement, either as a measure in the field of disarmament and détente or as a method of attempting to achieve German reunification. The CDU (apart from the so-called CDU dissidents who give an especially high priority to reunification) was clearly pleased by the clarity and finality of the American position. Furler, the CDU Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, publicly expressed his satisfaction that the American delegation had unanimously rejected any form of disengagement and had made it clear that the U. S. could not guarantee security of the Federal Republic, or reunified Germany, if there were disengagement since it would lead inevitably to a withdrawal of American troops from Europe.

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Also Baron Guttenberg (CSU) and Kiesinger(CDU), immediately after Dr. Mende's admission of the profound effect the unanimous position of the Americans had made on him, told an Embassy officer that the FDP was evidently "beginning to understand the realities of the situation"; and this, they thought, would make things easier for the CDU/CSU in future foreign policy debates.

The SPD was certainly also impressed by the unanimity and clarity with which all the Americans rejected military disengagement. They tried, however, to get out of the somewhat awkward position into which they were put by the emphatic American rejection of the heart of their "Germany Plan", by taking the public line that the American delegation was unrepresentative, it could not speak for the American Government, and it consisted for the most part of personalities who had flourished at the high point of the cold war."

The FDP reaction has been a combination of moving toward public acceptance of "reality" - that reunification via disengagement is impossible; and bitterness that this is the case. The FDP leader Mende in private conversation a few days after the conference told Embassy officers that, as a result of the unanimous rejection by the Americans of both parties of any disengagement, he and his party were, for the first time coming to the conclusion that reunification actually is impossible for the foreseeable future. Without military settlement in Europe - involving withdrawal of both American and Soviet troops from German soil - reunification is obviously impossible; and if, as clearly is the case, no responsible American is prepared even to consider withdrawal of U. S. troops from Germany, it follows that reunification is in fact unattainable. Mende did not, however, indicate that this meant the FDP, as far as it was concerned, would make things any easier for the Government and the CDU in future foreign policy debates. On the contrary, the FDP line in future might well be to stress that reunification is practically impossible - and this is the result of Chancellor Adenauer's mistaken policies. "This is the bankruptcy of German policy after ten years under Adenauer."

For convenience of reference, there is given here an outline of the more detailed report on the Conference transmitted as Enclosure No. 1 to this Despatch:

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There is also transmitted as Enclosure No. 2 to this despatch a more detailed account of part of the discussions in the political panel, which is of interest in that it indicates the specific positions on certain key issues taken by individual German and American participants. Enclosure No. 3 is a brief account of the Conference as viewed by the Germans which was published in the October 6, 1959 number of the Bulletin issued by the Federal Press and Information Office.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

William R. Tyler

William R. Tyler
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures: (1)

1. A Report on the German-American Conference at Bad Godesberg, October 1-4, 1959
2. A Detailed Account of Certain Aspects of the Discussions in the Political Panel
3. An Account of the Conference Published in the German "Federal Bulletin" of October 6, 1959

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The German-American Conference at Bad Godesberg, October 1-4, 1959

This report on the first "German-American Conference" (Deutsch-Amerikanisches Gespräch) held at Bad Godesberg October 1-4, 1959 is preliminary, in the sense that we anticipate that the Atlantik-Brücke organization, which organized the talks on the German side will, in due course, publish a fairly full report of the proceedings and conclusions of the conference. The present account is based, for the most part, on what was said at the opening and closing sessions (which Embassy officers were invited to attend); and on summaries of what was said at the "private" sessions published - or told to us privately by participants.

I. Bundestag President Gerstenmaier's Introductory Remarks; and the Opening Talks by Dr. Henry Kissinger and Adalbert Winstein on the "Military and Strategic Situation"

The conference was opened at a public session on the afternoon of October 1 which was attended by President Luebke and Chancellor Adenauer. The principal events at the opening session were speeches made by President Luebke, Bundestag President Gerstenmaier and Mr. McCloy.

President Luebke's address (the first political speech he had made since becoming President on September 15) aroused considerable interest because of the manner in which he emphasized not only German-American friendship and the role of the U. S. in protecting Europe's freedom, but also United States dependence, for its own security, on Europe including Germany. The relations of "understanding friendship" between the United States and the Federal republic, he said, are of the most vital importance for us here in Germany, and this friendship would endure for a long time to come. The United States, against its own will, had become the "protecting power" for the whole free world. On the other hand, the United States itself could not survive without a free Europe - and Europe without Germany could not be defended. Luebke's speech was widely reported in the next day's press under such headlines as "Europe Can't Be Defended without Germany"; "U.S.A. Can't Survive without a Free Europe".

Dr. Gerstenmaier's talk caused somewhat of a sensation because in the presence of Chancellor Adenauer he had the temerity to discuss German attitudes toward disengagement; and because he made it clear that in his opinion, while on the one hand, the great majority of the German Bundesstag would emphatically reject military disengagement if it were not linked with reunification, on the other hand a majority of Bundesstag deputies would be distinctly interested if such a disengagement could be linked with reunification. Those in the audience aware of how strongly Adenauer is opposed to even the mention of this subject in the presence of prominent Americans had the feeling that

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the Chancellor was probably highly annoyed by Gerstenmaier's remarks. In fact, Klaus Mehnert (the journalist expert on Soviet Affairs) who saw Chancellor Adenauer the next day, told an Embassy officer that Adenauer had expressed to him great concern over Gerstenmaier's remarks. The Chancellor told Mehnert that it was most disturbing just when he, Adenauer, was doing everything he possibly could to keep American forces in Germany, to have such a prominent representative of the CDU as Gerstenmaier come out with such ideas before an audience of such influential Americans.


Another point stressed by Gerstenmaier in his address was that Germany, and all Europe, are absolutely dependent on American support. He stressed that even if the political and economic integration of Europe should be successfully completely carried out, Europe's dependence on American support to withstand the military threat from the Soviet Union would still be absolute. The distribution of power in the world now and for the foreseeable future was such that even if Europe, through the maximum of political and economic integration should develop itself to the greatest possible political and economic strength, Europe would still be unable to defend itself against the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, and consequently the future security and well-being of the Federal Republic and of Europe as a whole was absolutely dependent on the continued support of the other gigantic world power, the U. S. A. For this reason, any idea of developing Europe as a "third force" was nonsense.

Mr. McCloy, speaking after Gerstenmaier, took issue with him on the subject of the importance of Europe. He said he thought that Dr. Gerstenmaier had unjustifiably tended to minimize Europe's great potential strength. If Europe should continue successfully its progress toward political and economic integration, with its vast resources and productive manpower Europe could become a force of great significance in opposing Soviet expansion. It was a mistake to underrate Europe's potential strength as he thought Dr. Gerstenmaier had done.

The press, the following day, reported Mr. McCloy's remarks in such a way as to give the impression that in contrast to Dr. Gerstenmaier, McCloy believed that Europe could or should become an independent third force. To correct this impression, at a press conference that afternoon (October 2), Mr. McCloy particularly stressed that in his statement he had not meant to give the impression that he believed Europe should or could be a "third force". He had meant rather to stress the very great potential strength of a united Europe and the importance which this strength, coupled with that of the U. S., could have in dealing with the expansionist tendencies of Soviet Russia and world Communism.

A. Dr. Kissinger's

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A. Dr. Kissinger's Address on the Military and Strategic Situation


The Conference sessions on October 2 began with addresses on the "military and strategic situation" by Dr. Kissinger and Adalbert Winstein (military critic of the Frankfurter Allgemeine).

Dr. Kissinger's address, which was a resumé of his well-known military-strategic theories as applied to the current situation and the problem of dealing with aggressive Soviet moves such as that against Berlin, set the tone of the whole conference. Kissinger said that as the balance of nuclear strength between the U. S. and Soviet Russia had in recent years become equal, with each great power capable of destroying the other, the U. S. nuclear deterrent as a means of preventing local Soviet aggression had become less and less "credible". Whether or not the U. S. will, in actual fact, make use of its strategic nuclear weapons to deal with local Soviet aggression is not the point; the point is that the Russians will, inevitably, not believe that the U. S. will risk its own total destruction to defend local areas in Europe or elsewhere in case of acts of aggression not involving direct attacks on the U. S. strategic deterrent. This means that the Russians will increasingly feel free to engage in or permit local attacks on positions outside of the U. S., believing that this can be done with comparatively little risk since the U. S. will not, in fact, defend such local points by use of its strategic nuclear weapons.

For Europe, this means that the West must have effective means, other than the U. S. strategic deterrent, to defend itself against local aggression. There must be independent military strength in Europe capable of local defense without involving use of the U. S. strategic deterrent. Such formidable independent local military strength in Europe would be credible, in the sense that the Russians would believe that this strength, since it did not necessarily involve destruction of the U. S. itself, would actually be used to defend local European interests in the event of a local Soviet aggression in Europe. It follows that the U. S. and Western Europe must build up very large and effective forces in Europe, both conventional and those armed with the tactical atomic weapons to such a strength that these forces alone, without use of U. S. strategic weapons, can defend the European NATO area, including the outpost of Berlin.

At the same time, Kissinger stressed that it would have a bad effect if Europe should develop its own strategic deterrent, because this might well result in the U. S. losing interest in the defense of Europe. It would be equally bad for Europe to leave the defense of Europe largely to the U. S. carrying most of the military burden; this might also cause the U. S. to lose interest in defending Europe, since American opinion would resent having to carry a disproportionate share of the vast expense of the military burden. In sum, the best solution

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
of the problem of how to defend Europe is for the U. S. and Europe jointly to build up much stronger forces in Europe, both conventional forces to deal with minor aggression and tactical atomic forces to deal with larger-scale aggression. The development of such forces would provide a credible deterrent, credible in the sense that the Russians would believe that it would actually be used to deal with any kind of Soviet aggression in Europe.

On the subject of disarmament, Kissinger said that the Soviets are now militarily so strong that they believe that the controls which are essential for disarmament would work to their disadvantage. The best way to get them to agree to disarmament controls would be build up Western military forces to a far greater strength than now - then the Soviets would really be willing to pay something to get disarmament. After this has been done, the Soviets might find it to their interest to agree to effective controls and genuine measures of disarmament.

B. Adalbert Weinsteine

Weinstein's speech, in which he put forward many heretical ideas, also aroused great interest; and much of the discussion in the working session of the conference later in the day was devoted to statements of sharp disagreement with the points Weinstein made. Weinstein began by saying that, because the population of the Federal Republic is not martial-minded, and does not have the will to defend itself, West Germany cannot play a very significant role in defending its own territory, or Western Europe, against Soviet aggression. The German forces presently planned will not be able to play an important part in defending German territory. The population does not support the German defense forces and German defense activities; and it does not have faith in the ability of German forces, however big, to defend Germany. Therefore, West Germany basically depends for its defense on others, primarily on the U.S., Great Britain and France. The trouble now, from the German standpoint, is that Great Britain is reducing the number of its troops stationed in Germany, and would like to reduce them far more radically. The French, although they have effective forces of over 400,000 men, have them engaged in North Africa instead of in Germany, facing the East, where they belong; and the U. S. force in Europe is too small for effective defense. If West Germany and Western Europe are to be successfully defended, there must be a great increase of American, British and French forces located in Germany, as well as a much greater buildup of German forces.

The British reliance on strategic atomic weapons to protect Britain (which is understandable from the British viewpoint) and the consequent British tendency to sharply cut down their forces in Europe is a serious problem for the Federal Republic. Germans also fear that as they build up their divisions, some day the Americans will feel that German forces are strong enough to do the job (which will never be the case), and begin to withdraw their own forces. However, West Germany's biggest problem is with the French who, with their own forces engaged in North



Weinstein then suggested some startling solutions to the difficult position in which he felt West Germany found itself. The alternatives seem to be; (1) that Great Britain and the U. S. make very great increases in the strength of their forces stationed in Europe to make up for the absence of the French; that this could be done seemed highly improbable for obvious political reasons. (2) that West Germany be provided with or allowed to develop its own strategic atomic deterrent. (3) that NATO as a whole, including West Germany, should take military action to help the French end the war in Algeria and thus enable the French to station their forces in West Germany to play their proper part in dealing with the Soviet threat.

II. The Discussions in the "Working Groups" (Panels) on October 2 and 3, as Summarized by Klaus Mehnert

After Weinstein's address the Conference participants were divided into two panels or working groups, one political and the other economic, to discuss respectively the politico-military and the economic aspects of East-West tensions. The panels did not have fixed agendas but each was provided with a list of topics for discussion. The topics for the political panel included such themes as: implications of the new military technology; deterrence of strategic and limited war; could NATO survive a neutral Germany?; disengagement; reunification, etc. The economic panel dealt with such themes as the Common Market, FTA and OEEC; problem of underdeveloped areas; East-West trade.

Klaus Mehnert, the well-known Soviet expert and editor of Christ und Welt was an active participant in the conference, and he also was rapporteur for the political panel on the last day of the Conference. On October 8 he published in Christ und Welt a summary of the discussions in the political and economic panel which is believed to be a quite accurate general picture of what transpired. The following account of the discussions in the panel is based on Mehnert's summary, supplemented occasionally from other sources.

A. The Political Panel

The meeting of the political panel opened with a lively discussion of the points Weinstein had made in his opening address. Weinstein had demanded strategic nuclear weapons for Germany and military support for France in Algeria from France's allies. These two points were rejected unanimously by the panel as was also Weinstein's statement that the Federal Republic lacked the will to defense. The panel then studied closely Germany's relationship with the Western alliance. The advocates

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
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of disengagement on the German side pointed out that their views were not due to any desire to shirk the duty of defense; and they emphasized that a Germany outside of the present alliance, as part of a disengagement arrangement, would have to be armed. They stressed that the reason for their desire for the withdrawal of American troops from Federal Republic territory was the certainty that there would be no chance of Soviet armies withdrawing from the Soviet Zone and the East European satellites unless the Americans were prepared to withdraw from the Federal Republic. They also stressed that the area of freedom in Europe could only be extended toward the East if there were a withdrawal of Soviet Armies. They conceded that the reunification of Germany could not be expected to come as a direct result of military disengagement; but they maintained that after a withdrawal of both Americans and Russians from Germany the chances of achieving reunification would be far more favorable. They maintained that the military equilibrium between the two world powers, the U. S. and the Soviet Union should not be changed; but that a new type of security system should be sought which would give to Germany, when not a member of the (NATO) alliance, as much security as it has as a NATO member. X

The opponents of disengagement argued that it was out of the question to station American divisions, after withdrawal from Germany, in France and other European countries. West European nations could not be expected to agree to the stationing on their territory of American troops and installations whose primary task would be the protection of Germany. Furthermore, the American Congress would not approve expenditure of the billions of dollars necessary for the purchase of land for barracks and training grounds, or for the construction of military barracks, air bases, etc., involved in such a transfer. Also there would be no question of the Americans leaving in the heart of Europe American divisions equipped with inferior weapons, that is to say divisions not equipped with tactical atomic weapons. All the American participants declared flatly that a withdrawal of American forces from the Federal Republic was certain to result in their withdrawal from Europe. Europe then would be exposed alone to the overwhelming pressure of the Soviet military machine. Once the Americans had withdrawn across the Atlantic, they could intervene in the case of a Soviet ultimatum to Western Europe only with strategic nuclear weapons. Could an American President, the Americans asked, be expected to "push the buttons of nuclear mass annihilation" in order to come to the assistance of a Europe which had insisted on bringing about the withdrawal of American divisions from Europe, knowing that this would lead to immediate Soviet retaliation, the annihilation of American cities and the death of millions of Americans?

It was the sentiment of the great majority of participants in the conference that until general disarmament is achieved, only the continued presence of American divisions in the Federal Republic can guarantee its security.

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On the subject of Berlin, there was complete agreement among all participants. Under no circumstances should interference with the freedom of the Berliners be permitted; it was, therefore, necessary that Western troops remain in Berlin. The Germans pointed out emphatically to their American guests that what was at stake in Berlin was not only the freedom of the Berliners; Berlin also symbolized the responsibility of the Four Powers for the reunification of Germany. As one of the German participants had put it: "it is absolutely essential that perpetuation of the division of Germany not be the price paid for the freedom of the Berliners." The Americans stressed with unanimity and clarity their support for the freedom of Berlin. "The United States will not give up Berlin" was the major of their statements.

Regarding the situation to the East, - the Soviet Zone and the satellite countries, during the discussion the Americans, for the most part, played the role of listeners. They wished to be informed - on German views on the situation in the Soviet Zone, - on the attitudes of the German parties toward the Oder-Neisse line, toward relations with Poland, etc.

Summarizing the political discussions Klaus Mehnert particularly stressed Dean Acheson's suggestions regarding new ways of organizing political and economic cooperation in the Atlantic Community. The German-American talks, he said, won special importance due to the fact that "Dean Acheson developed a new action program for the Western world. He said that NATO was performing the important function of providing military protection; however, the Western world lacked a similarly close cooperation in the political and economic fields. For this reason, he proposed the formation of an Atlantic Community whose tasks were to lie beyond the military field and whose member states, therefore, could also be countries which did not belong to NATO, such as Sweden, Switzerland, or Austria. Within the framework of such an organization it would also be easier to solve the bitter conflicts between the European Common Market and the Small Free Trade area.

"The importance of the German-American conversation could not be better proved than by the fact that one of the leading and most experienced statesmen of the Western world chose this platform for outlining a new and far-seeing plan."

B. The Economic Panel

In his brief summary (in Christ und Welt of October 8) of the work of the economic panel or working group, Mehnert said that central problems discussed in the panel had been the Common Market, Free Trade area question and the problem of Western help for underdeveloped countries.

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
The participants in the economic panel, Mehnert said, were agreed on the fact that a split of free Europe into two groups represented a grave danger. The German participants feared a hardening between the Six and the Seven and wished participation of the United States as a mediator. The second main subject of the economic group was the question of the behavior of the West toward the underdeveloped countries. Agreement existed on the fact that large-scale aid for the underdeveloped countries was required, but that it could not only be aid of an economic nature since in these countries some of the basic prerequisites of modern development, in particular in the field of education, are lacking. (For further details on discussions in the Economic panel, cf Page 3, Encl. 3)
III. The "Acheson Plan"

Since the suggestions first put forward in the "political panel" discussions by Mr. Acheson for new forms of organization of the Atlantic Community aroused great interest, and were commented on with considerable enthusiasm by several German participants in their concluding remarks on the last day of the Conference (see below), it seems pertinent to summarize at this point Mr. Acheson's proposals as we understand them.

During the discussions of the "political panel" Mr. Acheson spoke on this subject on the following lines:

There is need for another mechanism, in addition to NATO, for developing Western international cooperation in fields other than military. What is needed is real consultation on all matters of foreign policy, both political and economic, not only between nations members of NATO, but between all "Atlantic" nations, i.e., all the nations of Western Europe plus the United States and Canada. The kind of consultation he had in mind could not be adequately done in NATO, which had a primarily military purpose; and NATO is also inadequate because such countries as Sweden, Austria and Spain are not members. Illustrating what he had in mind, Acheson said there might be formed a high-level Council of representatives especially close to the heads of government and the foreign ministers of the countries they represent. Such representatives would have far more authority than that now enjoyed by the members of the NATO Council, where representatives receive instructions through telegrams probably drafted by relatively junior desk officers. (Acheson singled out the Dutch representatives on the NATO Council as exemplifying the type of high-level representation he envisaged.) There might be a ^{perhaps} treaty committing all member countries to certain common goals and obligations; and the Council would have authority to criticize signatories of the treaty if they did not act in conformity with the common goals and obligations spelled out in the treaty.

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Another mechanism, in addition to the high Council might be an international body comprising members of Parliament and prominent private citizens, whose function would be by periodic discussion constantly to make clear the goals of the organization and to keep the treaty alive and up-to-date. Members of this body would be free to vote as they feel individually (apparently meaning not necessarily in accordance with the views of their respective governments); and this body could issue authoritative statements and interpretations regarding the goals and obligations of the treaty, so that all members could be guided by a common standard. At the same time, there should be nothing supra-national about the organization; any country unwilling or unable to live up to the obligations of the treaty would be free to leave the organization if it chose to do so. Acheson indicated that the tasks of the new organization might include the following: to develop close economic cooperation between the members, including closer association between the "Six" of the EEC and the Outer Seven and the United States and Canada within the framework of the Atlantic group, for the purpose of increasing the general productivity and wealth; to work out common policies and programs for aiding underdeveloped areas and generally to formulate common policies for dealing with the expansionist tendencies of the Communist bloc.

Mr. Acheson stressed several times during the Conference that he personally, despite his suggestions regarding a "Council" etc., did not have specific organizational forms in mind. He indicated that he believed that such a new approach to the problems of Europe and the Atlantic Community would follow the pattern of the Marshall Plan. If Europe should make a proposal to the United States, he thought the United States would examine it with sympathy.

At the concluding meeting of the Conference on October 4, Mr. Acheson again referred to the Marshall Plan in discussing his new suggestions. He said that at the start of the Marshall Plan, the form that European reconstruction would take could not be foreseen. By joint U. S. and European efforts, the difficulties were overcome, and there have been far-reaching developments in Europe. But in the process one group of countries which participated in the Marshall Plan - the European "Six" - developed closer economic and political integration than was possible for the others. This had made problems for the U. K., the Scandinavian countries, Austria, etc., which were difficult to solve. If these problems could be dealt with in the broader framework of the Atlantic Community - including the Allies on the other side of the Atlantic - the U.S., and Canada - perhaps there would be more flexibility. Perhaps the difficulties

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could be solved without damaging anyone. A major goal of the far closer (than at present) political and economic relations within the Atlantic Community that he envisaged would be to increase the productivity of the community as a whole for three principal purposes: (1) to provide a growing standard of living for our own peoples; (2) to help underdeveloped areas out of our own wealth so that they will have a chance to develop; (3) to carry at the same time heavy burden of armaments. In suggesting that European problems be solved in a broader framework, Mr. Acheson said he was thinking not of a political maneuver, but of the basic conception which all share - of economic productivity - of increased economic productivity as the basis for future strength and well-being.

IV. The Concluding Meeting of the Conference (October 4). Remarks by Mommer (SPD), Gradi (CDU), Kiesinger (CDU) and Mende (FDP)

At the last session of the Conference on October 4, summaries of the deliberations of the political and economic panels were given by the rapporteurs of the two groups; and thereafter Mr. McCloy, who chaired the meeting, called on various prominent representatives of the German and American sides to make a few concluding remarks respecting the work and the themes of the Conference. In this framework, Mr. Acheson made the remarks reported above; and Senator Monroney made an interesting statement on the International Development Association (IDA), in which he gave to the Germans and to Professor Erhard, in particular, much of the credit for the successful establishment of IDA. There were also several statements of lesser interest from the American side. A number of the concluding statements made in this context by the Germans were of particular interest because of the manner in which they stressed the importance of Berlin as a symbol of Four Power responsibility for German reunification; or as indicating that the Germans, both Government and opposition, had been profoundly impressed by the unanimous and emphatic rejection by the American participants, irrespective of party, of the concept of disengagement as a means to achieve reunification. Four of these concluding statements by German participants - those of Dr. Mommer (SPD), Dr. Gradi (CDU), Kurt Kiesinger (CDU, Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Erich Mende (FDP) are summarized in the following paragraphs.

A. Dr. Karl Mommer (SPD)

Dr. Mommer, who is party whip of the SPD Bundestag faction, and an outstanding leader of the "conservative" or moderate wing of the SPD, stressed the importance of the West insisting that the Berlin problem be solved only in the framework of the German problem as a whole. He emphasized that whether or not the Russians continue to reject the idea, the West must always, in every negotiation, try to place the Berlin question in the frame of reference in which it belongs, namely that of the problem of Germany as a whole. Berlin is in an abnormal situation, but it is in such a situation

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only because Germany is divided; and the only genuine way to overcome its abnormality is to bring about reunification. We know very well how great the resistance to this is on the other side, and that this resistance probably cannot be overcome at the present time. While, unfortunately, we must recognize this, at the same time we must above all guard against winning a respite for Berlin by achieving temporary security through paying another price. It would be an illusion to believe that Berlin could be made permanently secure by paying the price of recognizing or acknowledging the division of Germany. If this were done, Berlin would still be an island without a land corridor to West Germany; and we could be sure that within a few years a new attack on Berlin would follow, and we would be pressed again to "pay another price." We must guard against following this pattern. If we try to solve the problem of Berlin's abnormality by writing off reunification and recognizing Germany's division, we would accomplish nothing since Berlin's abnormality and all the dangers involved in this abnormality would still be there. Addressing himself to the American participants, Mommer begged that when they returned to the United States they would make it clear that the will of the German people for reunification is a permanent factor in Europe; and that any policy is "built on sand" which speculates that the Germans could one day accept any other arrangement than reunification in freedom. Prospects for reunification today are dark and uncertain, but the will of the German people for unity would not become less. On the contrary, in the future it will grow steadily.

Mommer concluded his remarks by saying that he wished to emphasize once more that the opinion which Weinstein had expressed that the Germans had little will for self-defense in the case of aggression was false. The German people, in spite of all the difficulties brought about by recent history is determined beyond any question to maintain its freedom, and if the need should arise to make every sacrifice for this freedom. They are a peaceful people, but in no sense a people that are prepared to let themselves be subjected. Through all classes and levels, and irrespective of party, there is a strong will for self-defense.

B. Dr. Gradl (CDU)

Dr. Gradl, who is one of the CDU Bundestag faction's principal foreign policy experts, like Mommer emphasized the prime importance of Berlin as a symbol of German unity. Berlin, he said, is for the Germans the locus and symbol of common (Four Power) responsibility for Germany as a whole. He emphasized that maintenance of the position in Berlin is for Germans not an end in itself for the sake of Berlin alone; but rather that Berlin is for them the "clamp" holding together the two parts of Germany. Berlin is for the Germans, and it must also

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be for the Western Allies, the very foundation of the joint responsibility of the Four Powers for Germany as a whole. We know, Dr. Gradi said, that the Russians are trying to escape from this Four Power responsibility via the Berlin issue; and we hope and pray that in the coming discussions and negotiations over Berlin, nothing will happen that could weaken Four Power responsibility for the city. Further, we hold it to be of great importance that this Four Power responsibility be once again reaffirmed.

Speaking of future negotiations on the German problem, Gradi said he wished to remind his listeners that it was the unanimous desire of all parties in the German Bundestag, and of the Federal Government, that the Four Powers somehow arrange for continuing systematic talks and negotiations concerning the German question. And, he added, "we on the German side are ready under such a Four Power roof to make our contribution through 'internal German' (i.e., West German-GDR) talks of technical experts."

C. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU)

Kiesinger, who is now Minister-President of Baden-Wuerttemberg (and who, until he accepted that post some months ago, was Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and the CDU's principal foreign policy spokesman in the Bundestag) in his remarks stressed the "unanimous" American rejection of disengagement; and welcomed Mr. Acheson's "Atlantic Community" proposal as a most promising idea.

He wished to underline, Kiesinger said, what seemed to him a most important and serious point, namely the fact that the American attitude during the Conference on the question of disengagement, irrespective of party, had been completely united. "We have heard from the Americans, both military and civilians, with absolute clarity that they believe that Germany's being out of NATO would have the consequence that American troops would leave Europe". The thought was carried further (by the Americans) to the "crisis situation" after they had left Europe, when the American President would be faced with the decision of whether or not to push the button releasing the universal destruction of strategic atomic war in case of an attack on Europe after withdrawal of American troops. He wished to emphasize this point, Kiesinger continued, because it is important that we Germans realize that this is the clear and unanimous position of the Americans. On the other hand, on the German side the problem of disengagement has, of course, received much attention, because we are in a situation where the other side (the USSR) has a pawn in hand, and we cannot free it by force, we can only do so by political means.

Another "united opinion" in the Conference had been the idea that security must be maintained by the build up of strong forces; while at the same time, protected by this "immovable strong wall of weapons", we

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just develop active mobile policies. In connection with this concept, the development of active policies against the background of strong military security measures, he wished to say that he had been much encouraged because of the new and fruitful ideas put forward by Mr. Acheson, which he felt to be the most important matter to arise in the course of the whole Conference. "All of us here in Europe have lived with the uncomfortable feeling in recent years that the necessary solidarity of the West in the face of the world situation has not developed". Attempts had been made to bring about such solidarity within NATO. Considerable progress had been made and here and there, in the area of consultation, there had been a little progress; but what was really needed had not been achieved. In this area, he found Mr. Acheson's proposals to be extraordinarily interesting.

He welcomed the idea that, paralleling the NATO military organization, a broader organization should be formed to which could belong not only NATO members but also those countries which do not wish to join NATO; and the idea that this organization would strive for integration not in the sense of supranational arrangement as the "Six" desired, but rather in the sense of arranging for extensive consultation for the purpose of bringing about a fully united policy on the world political scene. The organizational proposals which Mr. Acheson had suggested were also of the greatest significance. There should not be a new Council of (Foreign) Ministers, but a "High Council", a council of men of great prestige, of highly qualified personalities of great reputation. And besides the Council, there should be an Advisory Assembly consisting in part of members of the legislative bodies of the various countries. He believed, Kicsinger said, that such an intensification of neighborly association of the countries of the Atlantic area might well give a completely new impulse to the cooperation of the Atlantic peoples. Furthermore since both sides, the American and the European, can fulfill their great task of maintaining freedom only by common action, he believed that through such closer association there would be achieved a better negotiating position of the West in the world struggle, not in the sense of developing a policy of strength manifested in threats and ultimatums, but rather simply that such a closely united Atlantic Community would be able to act with far greater authority. If a European had made these proposals, he would have said that it was something too good to be true. But since the proposals had been made from the American side, one could hope that there might really be a chance of their realization. If these ideas could be realized, he believed it could mean the beginning of a new life for the community of the Atlantic peoples.

D. Dr. Erich Mende (FDP)

Dr. Mende is Chairman of the FDP Bundestag faction, and also will probably become the party leader (succeeding Reinhold Maier) early in 1960. His statement at the concluding session of the Conference was of particular interest in that he made it clear that his own (and through

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
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him his party's) thinking about disengagement and reunification had been rather drastically affected by the absolute unanimity of the Americans at the conference - both Republicans and Democrats ⁱⁿ/rejecting disengagement.

His party, the Free Democrats, Mende said, had for years strongly supported the idea of creating a zone of decreased tension or disengagement in Europe. He would no longer use the word disengagement - he had learned from the Americans in this conference that disengagement is a bad word; he would, therefore, henceforth speak rather of "partial disarmament" (*Teilabrustung*) in Europe. We have learned from our American friends that this partial disarmament in Europe is inconceivable, and certainly cannot be carried out at the present time. All (on the German side) had been most strongly impressed by the fact that no spokesman for either the Democrats or the Republicans had, in any way, supported the possibility of creating such a zone of détente in Europe. "This has left a deep impression on me, and I have drawn from it the bitter political conclusion that at the present time there is no possibility of achieving the political unification of Germany via the path of détente in the military field." For us, disengagement was never an end in itself, but only a means to bring about political solutions, especially the unity of our country. He wished to stress, furthermore, that the unity of Germany was also not an end in itself, but rather a method of achieving freedom in "Middle Germany". There was for the FDP no thought of striving for a united Germany, if that united Germany was to be a peoples democracy. For the FDP, the divided Germany of today was by far preferable to a united, but Communist, Germany. He wished to thank his American friends for the frankness with which they had painted a realistic picture of Germany's situation. "It is better to know the realities than to indulge in illusions; and I believe that this conference will have an effect on the forthcoming Bundestag foreign policy debate on November 5."

Regarding the concept of neutrality, Mende said he wished to stress that none of the spokesmen for the German side at the Conference had supported the idea of neutrality. Neutrality between two blocs would be the "philosophy of a bone thrown between two bulldogs." Isolated neutrality would be for us not only not desirable, it would be fatal. Also "freedom from alliances" was not understood by his friends as meaning that Germany would stand alone between two blocs, - that also would be fatal. By "freedom from alliances" was meant only non-participation in the present regional alliances; and instead of this, participation in a greater European security alliance to which, of course, the United States and perhaps also the Soviet Union must belong as the guarantors of freedom on this earth.

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Shortly after Mende had made his statement, Baron zu Guttenberg (CSU) and Kiesinger (CDU) expressed to an Embassy officer great satisfaction that Mende - and the FDP - as a result of the American-German conference were apparently "beginning to understand the realities of the situation" - to realize that their disengagement "plan-making" was unrealistic and could not, in fact, bring about reunification. This, they thought, would improve the situation for the Government and the CDU/CSU in the November 5 foreign policy debate. Mende himself in private conversation a few days after the conference told Embassy officers that, as a result of the unanimous rejection by the Americans of both parties of any disengagement, he and his party were, for the first time coming to the conclusion that reunification actually is impossible for the foreseeable future. Without military settlement in Europe - involving withdrawal of both American and Soviet troops from German soil - reunification is obviously impossible; and if, as clearly is the case, no responsible American is prepared even to consider withdrawal of U. S. troops from Germany, it follows that reunification is in fact unattainable. Mende did not, however, indicate that this meant the FDP, as far as it was concerned, would make things any easier for the Government and the CDU in future foreign policy debates. On the contrary, the FDP line in future might well be to stress that reunification is practically impossible - and this is the result of Chancellor Adenauer's mistaken policies. "This is the bankruptcy of German policy after ten years under Adenauer."

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A List of the American and German Participants in the Conference

A. American Participants

Senators and Congressmen

Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat, Connecticut
Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Republican, New York
Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, Democrat, Oklahoma
Congressman Victor L. Infuso, Democrat, New York
Congressman Alvin M. Bentley, Republican, Michigan

Former High U. S. Officials

Other

B. German Participants

Bundestag Deputies and Laender Ministers

Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, CDU
Fritz Erler, SPD
Dr. Hans Furler, CDU
Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, CDU, President of the Bundestag

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Dr. Johann Baptist Gradl, CDU
Baron Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, CDU
Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, CDU
Dr. Erick Mende, FDP
Dr. Karl Mommer, SPD
Dr. Carlo Schmid, SPD
Kai Uwe von Hassel, Minister President, Schleswig-Holstein, CDU
Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Minister President, Baden-Wuerttemberg, CDU

Other

Hellmut Becker, Lawyer, President, Deutscher Volkshochschulverband, Kressbronn, Bodensee
Dr. Arnold Bergstraesser, Professor of Political Science, Chairman, Atlantik-Bruecke
Erik Blumenfeld, Vice Chairman and Treasurer, Atlantik-Bruecke, Hamburg
Dr. Hans Karl v. Borries, President (RTD.) Ruhr-Stickstoff AG., Essen, of Montagnola/Switzerland
Dr. Constantin v. Dietze, Professor of Economics, Freiburg i.Br. President of the General Synod of the Evangelical Protestant Church of Germany
Countess Marion Doenhoff, Journalist, Hamburg
Baron von Falkenhausen, Partner in Banking House of Burkhardt & Co., Essen
Ernst Friedlaender, Journalist Bad Godesberg
Karl Haus, Partner in The Banking House of Sal.Oppenheim Jr. & Cie, Cologne
Dr. Hans Hellwig, Journalist, Cologne
Dr. Klaus Mehnert, Journalist, Stuttgart
Dr. h.c. Alexander Menne, Member of the Managing Board, Farbwerke Hoechst Ag., Frankfurt/M.
Curt E. Schwab, Publisher, Stuttgart
Werner Traber, Member of the Managing Board, Hapag Hamburg
Adalbert Weinstein, Journalist, Frankfurt/M.

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A Detailed Account of Certain Aspects of the Discussions
in the Political Panel.


As has been pointed out above the panel sessions during the conference were "private" in the sense that representatives of the American Embassy, the German Government and the press were not invited to attend. However, the Embassy's Press Attaché, who had been requested to help with press relations for the conference was present during some of the discussions in the political panel. The following account of part of the political panel discussions is based on a report prepared by the Embassy's Press Attaché.

At the start of the discussions Weinstein was asked what he had meant in saying that German forces were not capable and could not play an important role in defending Germany. Replying, Weinstein conceded that the morale of German troops is not bad; the problem was that the population in the cities where German troops are garrisoned is not interested in the troops and does not have good relations with the troops. Dr. Hommer (SPD) and others on the German side disagreed with this statement.

Carlo Schmid (SPD) and others took issue with Weinstein's proposal that the NATO powers should participate in the Algerian war. Von Hassel (Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, CDU) stated that as far as the population of Schleswig-Holstein is concerned, it is certainly not true that the population is not psychologically prepared for defense. Von Hassel also said that giving wide publicity to Kissinger's views would help to increase popular support for defense, particularly among the female population. He also opposed strongly Weinstein's suggestions that West Germany have its own strategic deterrent or that Germany participate in the Algerian war. Weinstein remarked that even by 1963, NATO troops in Germany under present plans would be sufficient only for a 14-day battle. After this time, it would be a question of turning to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For this reason, Weinstein stressed, the West should have far more conventional troops stationed in Germany; and the burden of raising these troops must be distributed among the Western allies.

Klaus Mehnert remarked, appropos of Weinstein's statements, that the postwar change in German mental outlook had made the rearming of Germany quite difficult.

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
Regarding disengagement, Countess Doenhoff asked if the West would not gain more political maneuverability if disengagement could be brought about. Dean Acheson, sharply opposing the idea of disengagement, said that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany would break Germany's ties with the U.S. To do this would be to fly in the face of the reality of power. If it were done, the Soviet Union would make its will felt in Europe, Asia and Africa. Once they were out, he could not see how American Forces could return to Europe; whereas Soviet forces could return in 12 hours. Furthermore, it would not even be necessary for Soviet troops to return, since, in the absence of American forces, the shadow of Soviet power would fall all over Europe. Perhaps in 25 years or so disengagement arrangements might be possible, but certainly not earlier.

Dr. Mommer (SPD) said he thought that if U.S. and Soviet troops should depart from Germany, the generals and politicians could somehow establish again a military balance vis-a-vis the USSR. It was clear that as long as the U.S. forces are in Western Germany and Soviet forces in Eastern Germany reunification will be impossible. Khrushchev had also made it clear that for the USSR disengagement was not enough. Nonetheless Mommer thought disarmament proposals such as that of Khrushchev should be used in Western political strategy. For example implementation of Khrushchev's proposal regarding Europe would in fact be more dangerous to Soviet power than to the West, because the removal of Soviet troops would be most harmful for Soviet political interests in Eastern Europe. In contrast, if Western troops were to leave Western Europe, there would be no drastic political changes (i.e. no moves in the direction of acceptance of Communism).

On the subject of Berlin Dr. Gradi (CDU) stressed the vital importance of Western troops remaining in Berlin, - nothing could be substituted for these troops. Furthermore, Four Power responsibility in Berlin must at all costs not be given up. Dr. Mommer completely agreed with Gradi, emphasizing that if the West "paid a price" (i.e. gave concessions) in order to remain in Berlin, after a few years the Soviet would inevitably demand further concessions.

Von Hassel, Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, expressed his support for Mommer's contention that any concessions given now by the West to win Soviet agreement to maintaining the present

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General Gavin (U.S.) expressed his agreement with Acheson. He emphasized in addition that it was extremely expensive to relocate large troop units and installations. For example, one major problem would be the acquisition of land, an essential prerequisite before troops could be relocated. He then asked if there was any chance (through increased contacts, etc.) of expanding Western influence in the GDR and in the Soviet satellites where an unstable situation prevails.

Dr. Gradl replied that this would not be possible as long as Soviet troops were present.

Dr. Mende (FDP) referred to Acheson's statement on the impossibility of disengagement and said that Acheson's views certainly applied to the situation as it existed in 1949; but had not the radical changes in the military situation, such as the development of new weapons, made distances shrink and changed basic military concepts?

Acheson replied that the weight of the power of Soviet troops and the absence of Western troops in Central Europe would create a most dangerous situation if there were Western troop withdrawals. Here Dr. Kissinger's theory applied. To deter Soviet aggression, one should raise the threshold of violence by creation of a strong local defence so that the aggressor must initiate a nuclear attack.

Carlo Schmid pointed out that the German advocates of disengagement do not envisage a military vacuum in Germany, but propose strong German forces plus security guarantees by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He stressed also that if it is impossible to get the Soviets out of Germany, then the idea of reunification must be given up.

Dr. Conant said one can't pass such a judgment on the future.

Baron zu Guttenberg, referring to Carlo Schmid's remarks, asked what attraction there would be for the Soviets in a scheme which would provide for the creation of a strong German military establishment? Schmid replied that German troops would be added to the general security system in which both sides would participate.

Countess Doenhoff emphasized that political factors and possibilities should be considered as well as the military. For instance, disengagement would bring into play the weapon of freedom.

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
Dean Acheson commented that nobody favors confining our policies to the military field. Military security in itself, he said, is merely a beginning, not the end of policy.

Dr. Hommer (SPD) speaking of Poland said that it is quite impossible now for Poland to become independent of the Soviet Union. As long as the Oder-Neisse line is not recognized than the prospect of Poles receiving a relative degree of freedom is small indeed. On the other hand, from a political standpoint (in the West), the Oder-Neisse line cannot be recognized. This is something that has to be worked out in a Peace Treaty.

Carlo Schmid, speaking of combatting Communism in the under-developed world, said that Communism is not a belief in itself, but essentially a technique which the Soviets employ for the retention and expansion of power. We must show the less developed countries that we are their friends, and demonstrate to them that dictatorship is not necessary for progress. The West should pay much more attention to influencing certain cadres in these countries, such as trade unions, industrial leaders, etc.


Senator Monroney spoke at some length on the value of IDA as an effective instrument for aiding underdeveloped countries. The final conflict between freedom and slavery, he said, will be fought on an economic basis. The situation is much different in Asia than was the case in highly-developed Europe where only capital for postwar repairs was needed. The U.S. has incurred more ill will, dissatisfaction and frustration with the \$20 billion which it has used for aid to underdeveloped countries than in any other project. The International Development Association (IDA) working with the World Bank, constitutes a better instrument for aid to these underdeveloped countries. In the situation where you have a banker dealing with the client, you eliminate diplomatic incidents which go with unilateral or country-to-country loans. It is also better for the self-respect of underdeveloped countries if they borrow from an international institution rather than an individual state. The World Bank is not sufficient to meet the needs of underdeveloped countries because of the short-term nature of its loans (at 5-½ percent, 20 years for repayment, repayment in hard currency). The IDA would be a second mortgage operation, perhaps 40 years to pay at 2 to 3 percent interest with partial repayment in local currency. The World Bank would do all the preliminary work thus eliminating the need for an extra bureaucracy for IDA. These IDA loans would probably not turn out to be soft loans, particularly in view of the experience the U.S. has had with Federal Housing loans.

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Senator Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), speaking of Berlin, and the situation in the Soviet satellites, said that Soviet pressure is now only temporarily off Berlin because of the Khrushchev visit. It had only been postponed. Our position in Berlin is right and should not be changed; but if there are possible areas of adjustment perhaps that could be agreed upon, but so far he had not seen any. We should add to our diplomacy something new to counter the Soviet ultimatum which, incidentally, is a new factor in Soviet policy. We, in the West, are unaware of the deterrent presented to the USSR by the dissatisfaction and instability in the satellites. We should give encouragement to the liberation movement. It is a pipe dream to believe this can be accomplished from without, but it could perhaps be accomplished from within. In Hungary, for example, had United Nations observers been sent in at the proper time, maybe the situation would have been different. We in the West should not foment revolutions in the satellites, but should continuously raise the plight of the people of the satellites for discussion, and not permit the world to forget about it.

Dean Acheson, in the context of discussion of how the West should deal with the problem of Soviet and Communist expansionist tendencies, emphasized that it would be a mistake to act to correct a menace to ourselves by creating a menace to the Soviet Union. He did not mean that we should give up the idea of rolling back the Iron Curtain - but that, for example, in trying to bring about increased freedom in the satellites areas we should not act in such a way as to appear to threaten vital Soviet interests. But we should not accept Khrushchev's thesis - the remark he made (which Mr. McCloy overheard at a reception given by Harriman) during his visit to the United States that "what is ours and ours and we can compete for the rest." At this point Mr. Acheson introduced his ideas concerning possible new forms of organization of the Atlantic Community - designed to strengthen the West's whole position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to enable the West to counter more effectively Soviet and Communist penetration of the underdeveloped world. On the military side he suggested that the NATO treaties should be changed, made more effective and binding by spelling out the defense guarantees in more specific detail than is now the case. But there was also a need for another mechanism of international cooperation in addition to NATO. It is of great importance, he said, for the economic strength of the West that there be the closest ties between North America (the United States and Canada).



and Europe (including European countries that are not in NATO) so that trade is not restricted between the countries of these areas. Furthermore there is a need for real consultation on all matters of foreign policy. A possible method to achieve these kinds of international cooperation would be to form an international council with a high level membership and more authority (more, presumably, than the NATO Council); and, specifically, having authority to criticize signatories to a treaty which would commit the Western countries to certain common goals and obligations. Another mechanism could be comprised of members of parliament and highly-respected private citizens which would keep the treaty alive and up to date. Members of this mechanism would be free to vote as they feel; and this body would issue authoritative statements and interpretations (he had in mind something similar to the World Court) so that we could all be guided by common guide. Any country which was unwilling or unable to live up to its obligations would, of course, be free to leave such a grouping.


Carlo Schmid, taking up Acheson's suggestions, agreed that there should be some sort of over-all organization which would encompass North America and all Western European countries, both those within the Common Market, those outside the Common Market and the neutral countries.

Acheson said there might be two organizations, NATO and a larger mechanism. The larger mechanism could also, among other things, interest itself in aid to the rest of the world.

Senator Monroney said he thought there should be a general increase in ground troops in Europe, with a proportionate increase in both U.S. and European forces. Referring to Acheson's suggestions he said the U.S. would not want to be a member of a Customs Union, - but would be a "friendly brother" to the "Six" and "Seven" or all 13 together.

Acheson stressed that a new approach in Europe could follow the pattern of the Marshall Plan. If we - the United States, he said, were given a proposal by Europe, we would look at it with sympathy.

Dr. Henne (of the Farbwerke Hoechst A.G., Frankfurt) said that the Soviets have, through methods of economic warfare, upset the aluminum market. We need a Council (of the sort suggested by Mr. Acheson) to cope with just such problems as this.



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Dean Acheson said that an "indivisible" Western Community, an "indivisible" interest" would be in a position to offer the Soviets a mutual security treaty. Such treaties are possible between strong powers. We could say we won't attack one another. On the other hand, a Germany highly armed by itself would alarm the Soviets and hurt rapprochement with France.

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An Account of the German-American Conference Published
in the "Federal Bulletin" of October 6, 1959.


Following the pattern of the annual Anglo-German talks held in Koenigswinter (see The Bulletin of March 17, 1959) and the Franco-German talks also held each year, the first American-German talks took place last week in Bad Godesberg near Bonn. From October 1 to 4, some 50 prominent American and German politicians, scholars, bankers and journalists gathered for intensive discussions of "East-West Tensions: Present Status and Future Developments". The American delegation included among others Mr. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, General James M. Gavin, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard, Mr. John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner in Bonn, Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey, and Senators Dodd, ~~McCarthy~~ Keating and Monroney. On the German side were Dr. Arnold Bergstrasser chairman of the Atlantik-Bruecke, Herr Willy Brandt, Governing Burgoomaster of West Berlin, Dr. Ernst Friedlaender, journalist, Herr von Hassel, Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, and Herr Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Minister President of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Dr. Klaus Mehnert, journalist, Dr. Carlo Schmid, Vice President of the Bundestag, and Dr. Karl Monner, Dr. Erich Mende, Dr. Johann Gradl, Dr. Fritz Erler and Dr. Hans Fuerler, all members of the Bundestag.

For the opening ceremonies on October 1, President Luebke, Chancellor Adenauer, Dr. Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag, Herr Wilhelm Kaisen, President of the Bundesrat and members of the Federal Cabinet were present, while Herr von Brentano, the West German Foreign Minister, was present for the summaries of the discussions on October 4. President Luekke welcomed the delegates to the conference and called the theme of the talks extremely significant. The understanding friendship between the Federal Republic and the United States was characterized by the President as "of great importance to the future of Germany." Dr. Gerstenmaier in his speech referred to recent public opinion polls showing that 65 percent of those questioned were convinced that cooperation with the United States was essential for Europe. Dr. Bergstrasser and Mr. McCloy spoke for the Atlantik-Bruecke and the American Council on Germany, the two organizations which arranged the talks.

Frank Discussions

The actual discussions got under way on October 2, after speeches on the military and strategic situation of the United States and the Federal Republic by Dr. Kissinger of Harvard University and Herr Adalbert Weinstein, military publicist. Both speeches set up areas of discussion

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
for the panel groups and the ideas put forward were echoed again in the final summaries.

On October 4, after more than ten hours of discussions of a frank and open, though never acrimonious, nature, summaries of the discussion were presented and a few final comments were made by various members of the two delegations. In introducing the summaries Mr. McCloy said that the discussions had been pertinent and there had been a general consensus. He stressed, and this was repeated by other speakers, that there had been no "German-American issues" as such. While there had been disagreement among both the Americans and the Germans, there had been no disagreement along purely national lines, and this was encouraging and significant.

NATO and Berlin

The summary for the first panel, dealing with aspects and alternatives of the strategic and political situation of the West, was delivered by the group's rapporteur, Dr. Klaus Mohnert. He reported that the pros and cons of disengagement were discussed, the advantage of obtaining certain political possibilities as opposed to the disadvantage of probably having the American troops leave Europe. This latter was considered highly undesirable. No one was in favour of uncontrolled disarmament, while there was feeling that NATO should perhaps be strengthened. It was emphasized that security was not an end in itself, but only a beginning, a precondition for the attainment of freedom. Mr. Acheson's suggestions of a wider Atlantic alliance with political and economic aims, rather than military, so of particular interest.

In reference to Berlin, it was quite generally agreed that the status quo, if by that was understood the presence in the city of Allied troops, must be maintained. There could be no negotiation on that point and no one was in favour of disengagement in Berlin under the present conditions. The freedom of two and a half million Berliners was important and a symbol that the division of Germany was not final and irrevocable. Senators Keating and Dodd reaffirmed this, Herr Lohmer said there was virtually no disagreement on this score between the Government and the Opposition, and Herr Grasl, member of the Bundestag from Berlin, took the opportunity to say that Berlin and Germany were again grateful to see that there was no trace of doubt concerning the American resolution to hold and defend Berlin. Coming back to this point, Dr. Conant said he believed the free world needed

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to be given more frequent information on conditions in the Soviet zone of Germany.

Reunification - A Common Goal

It was emphasized that reunification would remain the goal of both German and American-German policy and that every peaceful possibility must be made use of to attain this goal. Herr Hommer stressed later that only reunification in safety and peace would be acceptable, and Herr Mende added that Germany would rather remain divided than accept reunification under Soviet domination.

As to the Oder-Neisse Line, no warlike solution of this problem was thinkable; the future German eastern frontier must be the result of peaceful compromise between friendly neighbours. It was felt that reunification should come first, so that Poland could be assured that the settlement, when it came, had the backing of all-Germany and not just that part under Soviet domination.

This group also considered the spiritual challenge, the twin problems of ideology and education. Dr. Gideonse, President of Brooklyn College, N.Y., who was a guest professor at the Free University of Berlin three years ago, stressed that "development" meant more than just the flow of hard currencies into certain lands, and more than the distribution of technical know-how. Freedom was, among other things, he said, "the right to share responsibilities" and provided which the West must meet successfully if the countries in question were to develop in other than a totalitarian direction.

Economic Questions

Mr. Leo Chernes, director of the Research Institute of America and rapporteur for the panel on the economic and social aspects of East-West tensions, reported that his panel had discussed European institutions, the countries in the process of industrial development, and East-West trade. He said that the panel had stressed the importance of patience in the development of the institutions, that the underlying wish for political integration must be seen in such institutions as the Common Market, and the wisdom of a final merger of the "Sixes and Sevens". German delegates had assured the Americans that U.S. anxiety over increased discrimination as European institutions developed was unwarranted.

In reference to aid for developing countries the group had been fortunate in the presence at the meetings of Senator Monroney, the author of the plan for the International Development Association recently called into being at the meeting of the World Bank in Washington

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Senator Monroney again stated the essentials of the new agency for the benefit of the entire group. He stressed the feeling that a new approach was needed - international action with long-term financing, lower interest rates and second mortgages.

Concerning East-West trade, a reduction of the U.S. embargo list had been urged by some of the delegates, in the hope that such a move might weaken the link between the USSR and Communist China. It was also felt that a central agency was needed to counteract Soviet trade moves, and the importance of Western cooperation in this sphere was stressed. The flow of capital investment into Berlin in the last year, since the November 27 threat of Berlin by Mr. Khrushchev, was taken by the panel as an indication of the West's total confidence in the courage of the Berliners and the economic vitality of their city.

Following this final session the conference came to an end, and the American group flew that afternoon to Berlin, where they were to spend two days seeing the city's situation for themselves. The delegates came away from the conference with the feeling that it had been, as Mr. McCloy had said earlier, "eminently worthwhile" and it is hoped now that a start has been made to continue regular discussions of this frank and off-the-record sort in future.

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